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Abstract: Economic growth in China in recent decades has largely rested on the dynamism of 
its cities. High economic growth has coincided with measures aimed at improving the 
efficiency of local governments and with a mounting political drive to curb corruption. Yet 
the connection between government institutions and urban growth in China remains poorly 
understood. This paper is the first to look into the connection between government efficiency 
and corruption, on the one hand, and urban growth in China, on the other and to assess what 
is the role of institutions relative to more traditional factors for economic growth in Chinese 
cities. Using panel data for 283 cities over the period between 2003 and 2014, the results 
show that urban growth in China is a consequence of a combination of favourable human 
capital, innovation, density, local conditions, foreign direct investment (FDI), and, city-level 
government institutions. Both government quality – especially for those cities with the best 
governments – and the fight against corruption at the city level have a direct effect on urban 
growth. Measures to tackle corruption at the provincial level matter in a more indirect way, 
by raising or lowering the returns of other growth-inducing factors. 
Keywords: Economic growth, cities, government efficiency, corruption, China 





High rates of economic growth have made China the envy of the world. Between 1990 and 
2014 China’s average growth rate was 9.82 percent per annum, clearly outperforming the 
growth of most countries in the developed and emerging worlds. Much of this dynamism has 
been a consequence of the rapid growth of Chinese cities. Urban growth in the larger cities, 
such as Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou, has outstripped average growth for the country, 
making Chinese large agglomerations – as predicted by most theories of urban economics – 
the main motors behind economic development. 
The lofty economic dynamism of Chinese cities has attracted considerable scholarly and 
policy interest on what factors determine urban growth in China. In recent years the number 
of studies has risen exponentially. Most of these studies have focused on elements which are 
at the heart of the main theoretical strands of urban economics. The location and accessibility 
of Chinese cities is one of those elements. Numerous studies have highlighted how being 
located close to the coast and/or having a better endowment of transportation infrastructure 
and, therefore, greater accessibility is crucial for urban economic growth (He and Pan, 2010; 
Bosker et al., 2012; Chen and Partridge, 2013; Brakman et al., 2016). The role of 
agglomeration and density has also been thoroughly scrutinised. Large and densely populated 
Chinese cities benefit from positive agglomeration externalities, which are still not offset by 
increasing levels of congestion and pollution (Au and Henderson, 2006; Chauvin et al., 
2017). Finally, education and innovation have been at the centre of research. Like elsewhere 
in the world, Chinese cities represent a magnet for skills and innovation (Chen and Feng, 
2000; Fleisher et al., 2010; Zhang and Zhuang, 2011; Liu, 2014; Li et al., 2015). The best 
Chinese human capital has flocked to metropolitan areas both in order to be able to attend the 
best universities, but also to find the best jobs and the best opportunities for personal 
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progress. Pools of high skilled labour in combination with large concentrations of firms 
facilitate knowledge circulation and, therefore, innovation. 
Yet, one important factor behind the dynamics of urban growth in China has been 
fundamentally neglected by research so far: the role of government institutions in generating 
and enabling the development of economic activity in urban China. In spite of the fact that 
empirical research on institutions covering other parts of  the world has matured considerably 
over the last two decades (e.g. Acemoglu et al. 2001; Tabellini, 2010), that the quality of 
government and the fight against corruption have taken centre stage in Chinese policy 
thinking in recent years, and that local capacity and integrity initiatives have become more 
prominent across different parts of China (Gong, 2015), there is no research on how 
government institutions shape urban growth. A handful of papers have tried to explore, using 
quantitative methods, how institutional factors shape economic outcomes at the individual, 
province or firm level (e.g. Cole et al., 2009; Nie et al., 2014; Zhang et al., 2015). However, 
none has ventured into the complex relationship between government efficiency and 
corruption, on the one hand, and Chinese urban growth, on the other. This implies that we 
know nothing about how the huge variability in government quality and in levels of 
corruption across Chinese cities and provinces affects the development of economic activity – 
the direct effect of government institutions – or facilitates/undermines the returns of 
improvements in accessibility, investments in skills and innovation, and the development of 
agglomeration economies – the indirect effects. 
The aim of this research is precisely to fill in this huge gap in our knowledge by asking two 
fundamental questions. First, to what extent do government institutions matter for urban 
economic growth in China? This will be achieved by looking at how levels of government 
efficiency and efforts at the city and provincial level to fight corruption are contributing to 
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fostering the economic dynamism of 283 of the 333 largest prefecture-level cities in China
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during the period between 2003 and 2014. The paper also assesses how government 
institutions feature relative to the more traditional factors behind urban growth – local 
conditions, FDI, economies of agglomeration, skills, and innovation – in promoting the 
economic dynamism of Chinese cities. 
Second, we distinguish between the direct and indirect effects of government institutions for 
urban growth. Do government institutions directly shape urban economic trajectories or do 
they do so by impinging on other factors known to be drivers of growth? This question will 
be answered by considering, in first place, government efficiency and the fight against 
corruption as direct inputs, much in the same way as improvements in human capital, 
innovation, local conditions, or agglomeration economies. The indirect effects of government 
efficiency and the fight against corruption will also be taken into account. Institutions will be, 
by means of interaction terms, viewed as facilitators/deterrents for the effectiveness of other 
growth-inducing factors. Improvements in government efficiency and in tackling corruption 
can enhance the returns of other factors behind urban growth. Conversely, policies aimed at 
improving human capital, generating innovation or improving accessibility can become 
ineffective in cities with low government efficiency or where corruption is rife (Rodríguez-
Pose, 2013; Rodríguez-Pose and Di  Cataldo, 2015; Crescenzi et al., 2016). 
The results of the analysis highlight how government institutions represent important direct 
and indirect ingredients of urban growth in China. In particular, government efficiency and 
the fight against corruption at the city level have directly shaped the economic trajectory of 
Chinese cities in recent years. The benefits of good government accrue mainly to those cities 
with the best government quality. Differences in the fight against corruption across Chinese 
                                                          
1
 Cities in ethnic minority autonomous regions are excluded from the analysis because of lack of complete 
sets of data. 
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provinces have, in contrast, not left a direct trace. Their association with urban growth has 
been indirect: cities in provinces where there has been less tolerance of corruption by public 
officials have seen the returns of improvements in human capital, innovation, social 
conditions, or agglomeration externalities increase, while this has been much less the case in 
areas of the country where there has been a more lax attitude towards provincial-level 
corruption. 
The paper contains six sections. The introduction is followed by a review of the factors of 
urban growth in China, paying particular attention to the limited amount of scholarly research 
that has considered government efficiency and other institutional factors. Section 3 looks at 
the stylised facts behind urban growth in China since the turn of the century, focusing on 
differences in wealth, economic dynamism, and in government institutional quality. In 
section 4 the description of the model and the structure of the dataset are followed by the 
empirical analysis. Section 6 presents the conclusions and some preliminary policy 
implications. 
2. Understanding of urban growth in China 
2.1. The traditional engines of urban growth. 
Which factors are perceived to be shaping economic growth depend very much on the 
theoretical framework adopted. In most approaches, skills and technology are considered 
basic for the development of economic activity in cities. Cities represent fundamental pools 
of human capital and technologies which, put together, create the right environment for 
improvements in innovation, productivity, employment, and economic growth (e.g. Florida et 
al., 2008; Storper and Scott, 2009; Glaeser, 2011). The New Economic Geography has tended 
to underline a different combination of factors. Where a city is located and how big it is are 
crucial to understand and predict its growth potential. Large cities benefit from considerable 
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scale economies and agglomeration externalities that attract talent, generate knowledge, and 
facilitate the circulation of knowledge and innovation (Fujita and Thisse, 2003; Duranton and 
Puga, 2004; Rosenthal and Strange, 2004; Duranton, 2015). In a similar way, urban 
economics has highlighted the roles of agglomeration and density for the creation of positive 
externalities that lead not only to higher levels of productivity (Combes et al., 2012), but also 
to more innovative, smarter, healthier, and happier cities (Glaeser, 2011). 
Research on the factors behind urban growth in China has been highly influenced by these 
strands of scholarly literature. Different authors studying urban growth in China have put the 
emphasis on different drivers of growth. Education and innovation, for example, have 
featured prominently in recent research on urban China (e.g. Chen and Feng, 2000; Fleisher 
et al., 2010; Zhang and Zhuang, 2011; Luckstead et al., 2014). These works have used a 
combination of provincial- and firm-level data to bring to the fore how skills and, in 
particular, technological capacity – fuelled by either investment in research and development, 
science and technology, or patenting – have influenced urban economic trajectories across 
China (Lai et al., 2006; Chun-Chien and Chih-Hai, 2008). 
Other authors (e.g. Bosker et al., 2012; Chen and Partridge; 2013; or Brakman et al., 2016) 
have stressed the role of location and accessibility using both firm-level and county-level 
data. In particular, Chen and Partridge (2013) evaluated the spread and backwash effects 
across the Chinese urban hierarchy between 2000 and 2010. They found that market potential 
in China’s mega-cities was inversely related to growth in smaller cities and rural 
communities, while medium-sized cities had positive spread effects. Hence, the location of a 




Some key authors in urban economics have brought to the fore how agglomeration and 
density (and the externalities generated by their combination) affect the economic 
performance of urban China. These studies have highlighted the net benefits of urban 
agglomeration economies for Chinese cities. The bigger the city, the bigger the benefit, 
meaning that many of the growth problems of Chinese cities in the interior are related to 
being undersized (Au and Henderson, 2006). From this perspective, nationally imposed, 
strong migration restrictions in the Hukou have created artificial market restrictions that 
prevented the growth of the most dynamic Chinese cities. This was considered to have had 
considerable consequences for overall growth across China, hindering the development of 
economic activity and resulting in significant income losses (Au and Henderson, 2006). 
Chauvin et al. (2017) delved into the importance of population density finding that the 
correlation between density, on the one hand, and earnings and economic performance, on the 
other, was strongest in China, relative to other large economies, such as Brazil, India, and the 
United States. Agglomeration and density also affect land rents and prices and the labour 
market condition: Zheng et al. (2006) found that the liberalization of the labour and land 
markets has been fundamental in explaining the diverse economic fortunes of Chinese cities. 
Among other growth inducing factors, Zheng and Kahn (2013), Snow et al. (2016), and Lin 
(2017) have drawn attention to the role of infrastructure for city-level growth, while Deng et 
al. (2010), Ding and Lichtenberg (2011), and Bai et al. (2011) have underscored issues of 
land availability and land use. Trade and FDI have also featured in the literature. Levels of 
trade were found by Chen et al. (1995) and Liu et al. (2002) to heavily influence urban 
growth trajectories. Changes in world demand have also been at the heart of analyses of 
urban performance, with much of the income and population growth of Chinese cities over 
the past 30 years powered by variations in trade (Zheng et al., 2010). 
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Finally, sectoral structure and population dynamics have also been deemed to influence urban 
performance. According to Chen and Feng (2000), Chinese provinces with a greater presence 
of private and semi-private enterprises, a better endowment of higher education, and greater 
access to international trade became leaders in terms of economic growth. The growth of 
working-age population has been considered to undermine levels of per capita GDP growth 
(Golley and Wei, 2015). 
2.2. Institutions and urban growth in China 
Yet, despite the significant attention afforded to urban economic development in China, one 
basic factor that is generally acknowledged to determine the economic performance of 
territories has been overlooked by the literature: institutions. Notwithstanding important 
developments in our understanding of how institutions affect economic growth, both at the 
national (e.g. Acemoglu et al. 2001) and regional level (e.g. Tabellini, 2010; Crescenzi et al., 
2016), institutions, in general, and government institutions, in particular, have not played a 
role in the burgeoning literature dealing with urban economic growth in China. There are 
multiple reasons for this. First, institutions are hard to define and most authors dealing with 
their role in economic development adopt rather different definitions of institutions (Gertler, 
2010; Rodríguez-Pose, 2013). Second, institutions very often do not change much over time. 
Institutions of all types are particularly embedded in territories and shape their economic 
fortunes for lengthy time periods (Putnam, 1993; Acemoglu et al, 2001; Duranton et al, 
2009). Third, notwithstanding the problems of definition, institutions are very hard to 
measure. Most researchers working on institutions have resorted to either ‘objective’ or 
‘subjective’ measures of institutions, all of which have been hugely controversial. Hence, 
measuring government quality or the level of fight against corruption – to mention just a 
couple of important institutional factors that can shape urban development – is always bound 
to be shrouded in controversy. 
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These reasons potentially explain the lack of attention that scholars working on China – 
Chinese and otherwise – have paid to how government institutions affect urban development. 
However, growing residuals in economic growth equations are stressing that there is a need 
to delve deeper into the functioning of government institutions in order to better understand 
how cities, in general, and Chinese cities, in particular, grow. 
There is no research so far that has tried to go into this at an urban level. To date, a handful of 
papers have looked at specific institutional issues – and, especially, corruption – at firm-or 
individual-level. Nie et al. (2014), for example, explored the impact of corruption on local 
firms’ total factor productivity (TFP), using firm-level data from 1999 to 2007. The impact of 
local corruption on productivity highly depended on the ownership structure of the firm. 
Corruption was deemed to have had no effect on state-owned firms while, somewhat 
surprisingly, it led to higher productivity in private firms. The negative effects of corruption 
on TFP were mainly felt in those firms with a larger ratio of fixed capital and in firms with a 
more complex structure of intermediate goods, which provided more opportunities for the 
emergence of corruption.  Zhang et al. (2015) focused on the impact of corruption on the 
individual. They studied how corruption affected individual incomes based on a survey data 
for China in 2008, in combination with World Bank 2005 survey data. They reported that 
corruption greatly reduced income by decreasing the returns to education of residents in 
urban areas and increasing the returns for those living in rural areas. Choi et al. (2015) found 
a positive relationship between government quality at provincial level and firm performance, 
while Reinecke and Schmerer (2017) provided evidence to support the link between 
provincial government efficiency and firm-level exports. 
The research that has ventured into the institutional minefield from a purely territorial 
perspective has been far rarer. Cole et al. (2009) were the pioneers. They examined the 
impact of government efficiency and anti-corruption measures on FDI location in China 
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using provincial-level data from 1998 to 2003. They showed that high levels of government 
efficiency and efforts to fight corruption drew considerable amounts of FDI to the provinces 
that had made the biggest strides in this respect. Tang et al. (2014: 151) pointed that 
government efficiency at provincial level was “an important factor in strengthening the 
regional economy”, although they considered the direction of causality problematic. 
There is no quantitative research on institutions that focuses on urban China. Hence, a 
considerable gap in our knowledge remains about the extent to which differences in 
government quality and in the will to fight corruption affect the economic fortunes of Chinese 
cities.  
This paper is thus the first to examine the connection between government efficiency and 
corruption, on the one hand, and urban growth in China, on the other, an association that 
remains extremely poorly understood. We look into two types of effects that can be 
associated with the relationship between government institutions and economic growth. The 
first is the direct link between institutions and economic activity. According to North (1990), 
institutions are the rules of the game that shape human activity. Government institutions, in 
particular, affect how different economic actors interact in space and can therefore generate 
trust or mistrust and determine transaction costs in different environments. Efficient 
governments and low levels of corruption therefore represent powerful incentives for 
economic activity (Ahrend et al., 2017). By contrast, inefficient governments and high levels 
of corruption increase transaction costs and discourage interaction. In this respect, 
government institutions are as connected to urban economic growth as skills, innovation, or 
infrastructure endowments. 
Government institutions can also influence economic performance at city level in a more 
indirect way. In the presence of inefficient governments and high levels of corruption the 
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returns to skills, innovation, and better accessibility can be seriously weakened. Corruption 
contributes to non-transparent labour markets in which employment and the use of skills are 
often related not to merit but to personal connections and the presence of clientelistic and 
nepotistic networks (Di Cataldo and Rodríguez-Pose, 2017). This can drive talent away from 
the labour market and lead to migration and brain drain. Similarly, inefficient governments 
will deliver ineffectual and/or wasteful policies, thus undermining the returns of any other 
type of investments conducted at the local level. There is a growing literature that focuses on 
this type of indirect effects. For example, when assessing the impact of quality of government 
on infrastructure investment for 166 European regions during a period from 1995 to 2009, 
Crescenzi et al., (2016) find a significant relationship between government quality, decisions 
on what type of infrastructure to invest in, and regional economic outcomes. Other 
contributions have examined the effects of institutions on the returns of public investments 
(Rodríguez-Pose and Garcilazo, 2015), regional competitiveness (Annoni and Dijkstra, 2013) 
or innovation (Rodríguez-Pose and Di Cataldo, 2015). How institutional quality affects 
entrepreneurship (Nistotskaya et al., 2015), migration (Ketterer and Rodríguez-Pose, 2015), 
environmental conditions (Halkos et al., 2015), and even political participation (Sundström 
and Wängnerud, 2014) has also been subject to scrutiny. Yet, this literature has been mostly 
restricted to European regions. There is virtually nothing for Asian countries and nothing for 
urban areas in China.  
 In this paper we cover this massive gap and examine both direct and indirect mechanisms by 
looking at how the government efficiency of different cities in conjunction with efforts to 




3. Urban growth in China: some stylised facts 
China is the urban ‘champion’ of the world. The country has witnessed the biggest urban 
transformation ever: between 1980 and 2010, the urban population in China rose by 480 
million (Wong, 2013: 273). It also boasts the largest concentration of cities in the world. 
Among a total of 561 agglomerations in the world of more than 1 million people, 114 are 
located in China (citypopulation.de, 2018). The country also hosts the largest agglomeration 
(Guangzhou, with 45.6 million) and the fourth largest agglomeration (Shanghai, with 29.5 
million) (citypopulation.de, 2018). Eight further cities – including Beijing, Tianjin, Xiamen, 
Chengdu, Wuhan, Hangzhou, and Chongqing – are among the 50 largest metropoli in the 
world (citypopulation.de, 2018). 
The geographical distribution of cities in China is, however, very uneven, both in terms of 
population and wealth. The largest agglomerations in China are located in the most accessible 
places: mainly on the eastern seaboard and along the main Chinese rivers: the Yellow River, 
the Yangtze River, and the Pearl River. Smaller agglomerations tend to be located further 
away from the coast in inland provinces, such as Karamay in Xinjiang province (0.39 million 
people in 2014) or Jiayuguan in Gansu province (0.24 million people in 2014). This 
distribution mirrors, to a large extent, the division between rich and poor cities. The richest 
Chinese cities – pictured in a darker colour in Figure 1 – are located along the coast, in the 
north-east, and along the course of the rivers. Both in the case of the urban hierarchy and the 
wealth of cities there was relatively little change between 2003 and 2014, the period covered 
in the analysis (Figure 1). 
Insert Figure 1 around here 
The core/periphery distribution in terms of urban size and wealth is, however, not replicated 
by urban growth rates during the period considered. As shown in Figure 2, many of the more 
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developed cities did rather well in economic terms, but quite a large number – fundamentally 
cities along the Pearl River and Yangtze River deltas – had growth levels well below average. 
The same variety in economic performance can be observed among the less developed cities 
at the beginning of the period. Whereas a number of relatively less well-off cities in lagging 
behind provinces – such as Yulin (Guangxi province, average growth rate: 27.97 percent), 
Erdos (Inner Mongolia: 20.9 percent), Chaoyang (Liaoning province: 20.32 percent), or 
Liupanshui (Guizhou province: 20.16 percent) – performed extremely well during the period 
of analysis, other less developed cities – such as the Guangdong province cities of Dongguan 
(average growth rate: 1.46 percent) and Zhuhai (6.20 percent) –  were among the poorest 
performers. Other cities in richer areas, such as Hengshui in Hebei (9.04 percent) and Qitaihe 
(9.16 percent) in Liaoning, had indistinct economic performances relative to the rest of the 
country (Figure 2). 
Insert Figure 2 around here 
If we consider institutional quality,
2
 its distribution across cities in China differs significantly, 
depending on whether government efficiency or attempts at controlling corruption are 
considered. In terms of government efficiency, there is a strong correlation between wealth 
and good government. Most of the cities that top the government efficiency ranking are well-
off cities located along the coast. From Harbin, in the north-east to Haikou, on the southern 
island of Hainan, the majority of coastal cities have levels of government efficiency clearly 
above average. Some large and relatively wealthy cities in the interior, including, Kunming, 
Xi’an, Tongchuan, Changsha, Karamay, Taiyuan, Baotou, or Ganzhou, also score relatively 
well in the government efficiency ranking (Figure 3). By contrast, low government efficiency 
is the norm along an axis that covers the first ring of inland cities beyond the coast. This ring 
                                                          
2
 The measurements of the two institutional quality variables included in the analysis (government 
efficiency and the fight against corruption at urban level) are presented in detail in section 4. 
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includes, to name a few, Hebi, Zhangjiajie, Lvliang, Ezhou, Baoding, Luohe, Dazhou, or 
Wuzhong, cities that are mostly located in Hebei, Henan, Anhui, Hunan, Hubei, and Guangxi 
provinces. Low government efficiency is also in evidence further inland in Sichuan, Ningxia, 
and Gansu provinces (Figure 3). This geographical distribution of urban government 
efficiency mirrors that proposed by Tang et al. (2014) at provincial level. 
Insert Figure 3 around here 
The core/periphery pattern is, however, not reproduced in terms of the fight against 
corruption. While some of the most developed cities like Beijing, Tianjin, and Qingdao top 
the rankings in the number of corruption cases brought to justice, many wealthy cities in 
Guangdong or Jiangsu provinces, such as Dongguan, Zhanjiang, Shaoguan, Suzhou, Suqian, 
and Lianyungang, had lower levels of prosecution than some of less developed cities in Jilin 
or Qinghai provinces, such as Changchun, Liaoyuan, and Xining (Figure 4). This factor is 
reproduced in relative terms, as, with the exception of Changchun, the former cities in Guangdong or 
Jiangsu provinces are larger than those mentioned in Jilin or Qinghai provinces. Hence, the fight 
against corruption was more evenly spread across the economic development spectrum than 
government efficiency. 
Insert Figure 4 around here 
4. Model, data, and econometric strategy 
4.1. Model and data 
What shapes urban growth in China? In order to answer this question we resort to analysing 
the different potential factors behind urban growth, while paying particular attention to the 
direct and indirect role of government institutions on urban growth. A simple endogenous 
growth model in which economic growth is explained by the endowments of human capital, 
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innovation and technology, density, FDI, and local conditions – the ‘social filter’ (Fagerberg, 
1988; Rodríguez-Pose and Villarreal-Peralta, 2015) – is proposed. 
The model adopts the following form: 
 !"#$%&'(,) = * + -.!"#$%&'(,)/. + *.!"0""1(,)/. + *23'(,)/. + *456"7089(,)/. +
*:!"&1&;(,)/. + *<71'0>!?0!86@(,)/. + *AB$C(/. + *D0"7808;801"7( + νt+EFG        (1)                             
where  
 !"#$%&'(,) = !"#$%&'(,) H !"#$%&'(,)/. is the dependent variable and depicts the 
economic growth rate measured by the change in the natural logarithm of GDP per capita 
from time t-1 to time t in city i; 
!"#$%&'(,)/.represents the natural logarithm of GDP per capita at time t-1 in city i. The 
initial GDP per capita is used as an indicator of the degree of wealth of the city, as a means to 
assess if initial city wealth influences subsequent economic performance – and, in the 
process, identify potential urban convergence or divergence trends; 
!"0""1(,)/.  represents a proxy for the innovation output of city i at time t-1. Innovation is 
proxied by the natural logarithm of patent applications per capita; 
3'(,)/. depicts the human capital endowment at time t-1 in city i, proxied by the average 
schooling years of the population;  
56"7089(,)/. is the population density at time t-1 in city i. Density represents a measure of 
positive urban externalities regularly used in the urban economics literature (e.g.  Charlot and 
Duranton, 2004; Nakamura, 2006; Crescenzi et al., 2012); 
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 !"#"$%,&'( is the natural logarithm of the population of city i at time t-1, which is 
traditionally used in the literature as a proxy for urban agglomeration (e.g. Fujita et al., 1999; 
Au and Henderson, 2006; Castells-Quintana and Royuela, 2014);  
 !"#$%&#%'()*,+-. represents the social filter of city i at time t-1. The social filter is a 
composite index resulting from combining a unique set of social and structural elements that 
may facilitate or deter the development of economic activity in a given place (Rodríguez-
Pose, 1999: 82). The social filter used in the analysis includes indicators of demographic 
structure (share1524 or the share of the population between 15 and 24 as a share of the total 
population in city i), sectoral composition (shareagri or the employment share in the 
agricultural sector in city i), use of human resources (unemp or the unemployment rate in city 
i), and ownership structure (sharepri or the share of employment in private firms in city i, 
including the self-employed). The composite social filter index is created by means of 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA). The test results for the first Principal Component 
Analysis are reported in Table A-1 in the appendix;  
/01*-. stands for the percentage of local economies fuelled by foreign direct investments, 
proxied by the realised value of FDI as a share of GDP at time t-1 in city i;  
νt is a time-dummy; and   
234 is the error term.  
The main independent variables of interest refer to proxies of government institutions. These 
appear in the model as: 
#5 '#'6'#!5 * which portray the quality of government institutions in city i. Three different 
indicators for institutions are used in the analysis. The first one is the ‘government efficiency 
index’ for prefectural cities in 2016. The data are derived from a ranking of the efficiency of 
city governments at prefectural level in China in 2016 (Academy of Government, 2016; Tang 
17 
 
and Zhu, 2017), which propose a composite city-level government efficiency index 
evaluating four dimensions of government efficiency: a) public services (weight=0.55); b) 
government scale (0.2); c) national welfare (0.1); and d) transparency of government affairs 
(0.15). A total of 36 different variables are included in these four categories (greater detail 
about the individual components included in this index can be found in Table A-2 in the 
appendix). The resulting index is transformed into a ranking of government efficiency for 
each Chinese city (Table A-3). The inverse of the ranking number for each city is included in 
the analysis as an indicator of overall city-level government efficiency index. The higher the 
value of the variable, the higher the government efficiency attributed to any particular 
Chinese city. A key function of the government is to improve resource allocation efficiency. 
An efficient government will, in all likelihood, streamline administration and delegate 
authority, improve the quality of civil services, reduce operation costs, and help maintain the 
rule of law and the fairness of market deals. Better public services and greater transparency 
will also be proxies for more efficient governments. In this respect, the quality of government 
index adopted in the analysis covers most of the basic functions of government.  
The second proxy for government institutions reflects one of the main policy drives aimed at 
improving institutional quality across China in recent years: the fight against corruption. The 
fight against corruption at the local level in China has acquired greater prominence in recent 
years. The central government in Beijing is increasingly holding local governments more 
accountable for integrity management (Gong, 2015) and for tackling corruption. However, 
the variety of local government responses in this field remains striking. The fight against 
corruption is represented by two different variables in the analysis: one at city level and the 
other at provincial level. At city level, it is measured by the number of corruption cases 
prosecuted in each individual city between November, 2015 and July, 2017 – the only period 
for which public data were available at the time of collection. The data stem from a website 
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set up by the Chinese government with the aim of increasing transparency and disclosing 
potential corruption cases among civil servants for each city on a monthly basis. Following a 
frequent practice in the corruption literature (e.g. Boyland and Long, 2003; Cordis and Milyo, 
2016), we measure the total number of corruption cases prosecuted in each city, we are able 
to get a proxy about how seriously local authorities are tackling corruption amongst their 
employees. 
The fight against corruption is also considered at the provincial level. Provinces have been 
crucial actors in the effort to curb corruption in China, but the zeal with which different 
provinces have tried to address corruption vary significantly from one province to another 
(Dong and Torgler, 2013). As the Chinese administrative system works as a nested hierarchy 
(Wong, 2009), city-prefectures interact mostly upstream with provincial governments. This 
implies that what happens at provincial level in terms of confronting corruption is bound to 
have an influence at the city level. We use the number of criminal cases involving civil-
servants per 100,000 public officials as a means to measure differences in the stress put by 
provinces to fight corruption. We expect that, given the size of Chinese provinces, the 
connection of this variable with urban growth will be lower than that of tackling corruption 
by local authorities. However, it is often the case that measures against corruption at a 
provincial level set the tone for similar proceedings in the cities within a given province. 
Hence, the association between fighting corruption at provincial level and city economic 
growth can be expected to be weaker and more indirect than that of fighting corruption at city 
level. 
The names of variables with their units of measure and data sources can be found in Table 1. 
Table A-4 in the appendix lists the descriptive statistics of the main variables.  
Insert Table 1 around here 
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All explanatory variables in the model are lagged by one year, providing a panel data 
structure. The data in this study cover 283 cities over 2003-2014 period. We thus assume that 
economic growth is the result of past endowments and of investments aimed at promoting 
economic growth in Chinese prefectures. There are two exceptions to this rule. The data for 
government efficiency and the fight against corruption at city level is only available for one 
period of time, 2016 for the former and 2015-2017 for the latter. This reflects a lack of panel 
data for most government institution indicators. Institutional data is hard to come by and even 
harder to trace back in time. Lack of this type of institutional data forces us to assume that the 
efficiency of city governments and efforts to fight corruption in China have not varied greatly 
during the period of analysis. While this assumption implies certain risks, many authors 
working on the importance of institutions for economic development have highlighted that 
institutional quality in a given place changes very slowly with time, if at all. The persistence 
of institutional factors has been emphasised, among others by Todd (1990, 1991), Putnam 
(1993), Acemoglu and Johnson (2006), Greif (2006a, 2006b), or Duranton et al. (2009). 
Moreover, while it is true that institutional constructs often adapt to policy changes, at the 
same time they remain resilient to change and often are a key driving force shaping the 
adaptation of policies to local contexts (Trigilia, 1992; Rodrik, 2003; Storper, 2005; 
Rodríguez-Pose, 2013). Hence and despite policies targeting specific areas of the country, 
such as the Western Development Plan, established by the Chinese government in 2000, 
institutional factors are durable, path dependent and – albeit pliable to short-term alteration – 
resilient to longer-term transformations. Hence and because of lack of alternative time series 
data, we assume that Chinese cities that had more efficient governments which were keener 
on pursuing corruption in 2003, remained so until the end of the period of analysis. 
4.2. Econometric strategy 
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The use of two time-invariant independent variables has implications for the econometric 
approaches that can be adopted. The inclusion of the variables depicting government 
efficiency and the fight against corruption at the city level rules out the possibility of 
conducting fixed effects panel data analysis. Two alternatives are employed. First, the 
regression is run using panel data with random effects, which allows for the introduction of 
time-invariant variables. Second and more importantly, we resort to a Hausman-Taylor (HT) 
estimation as our main econometric strategy.
3
 
The HT basically represents a blending of a fixed- and a random-effects estimator. The 
advantage of the model is that for all time-varying indicators included in the analysis, the 
resulting coefficients are similar to those of panel data, fixed effects models. This is a 
consequence of relying on the within transformation of each variable for which panel data are 
available to compute consistent coefficients (Baltagi et al., 2003). The advantage of HT 
econometric methods relative to fixed effects panel data analysis is that it allows to estimate 
coefficients for time-invariant variables and uses the other regressors as instruments for the 
calculation of the coefficients for the time invariant variables. As the two time invariant 
institutional government variables are exogenous, the expectation is that the coefficients 
derived from the analysis are not biased.  
5. What shapes urban growth in China? 
More skills, innovation, better local conditions, or more density on their own are not 
sufficient to generate the high levels of urban economic growth that China has experienced 
over the last decade and a half. In Figure 5 some of the independent variables – depicting 
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 A third alternative consists of transforming the government efficiency index at urban level into a time-
variant variable, assuming that the rank and index change of government efficiency for each city follow the 
same pattern of its province. This creates a new government efficiency variable available only for the 
period between 2011 and 2014. Using this new variable yields results that confirm those of the main 
analysis presented in Tables 2  and 3: government efficiency, proxied by the new time-variant indicator, 




factors that may be behind urban growth – is plotted against urban economic performance 
between 2003 and 2014. In all cases, the regression lines are virtually flat. This signals that 
not a single factor seems to propel Chinese urban growth during the period of analysis. 
But is Chinese city growth the result of a combination of all these factors? And what is the 
role played by government institutions at the local level? These are precisely the questions 
that the econometric analysis addresses. Given the descriptive analyses presented in the 
previous two sections, we expect that urban growth in China is a) the result of a combination 
of factors, ranging from skills, innovation and density to FDI and that no individual factor 
dominates; b) that institutions – proxied by government efficiency and the control of 
corruption – matter for urban growth; and c) that the role of institutions in urban growth is 
both direct and indirect (by affecting the potential returns of other factors). In Table 2 we 
present the results of the random effects panel data analysis and that of the Hausman-Taylor 
estimations.  
Insert Figure 5 around here 
The coefficients of Table 2 show that urban growth in China is indeed correlated with a 
combination of factors that, put together, guide economic activity and economic performance 
across Chinese cities. The coefficients for innovation (patenting), FDI and human capital are 
strongly positive and significant regardless of the econometric method used. They are also 
robust to the introduction of different government institution proxies (Table 2). The variables 
for density and the social filter – depicting the overall socio-economic environment in any 
given Chinese city – are positive and strongly (with the exception of regression 6 for the 
social filter) significant in the Hausman-Taylor estimations (Table 2, Regressions 4 to 6). 
These results are robust to the decomposition of the social filter into its four components – 
the share of private firms, the percentage of population working in the agricultural sector, the 
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share of population between 15 and 24, and the unemployment rate (Table A-5). The 
coefficients for all the components of the social filter have the expected sign: positive and 
significant for the share of private firms; negative and significant for the share of agricultural 
workers; insignificant for the share of young population; and negative and significant for 
unemployment rate (Table A-5).  
Hence, the most dynamic Chinese cities have grown as a result of a better endowment of 
skills, a greater capacity to innovate, better local social economic conditions, larger inflow of 
FDI, and more positive externalities derived from density. 
Insert Table 2 around here 
The government institution variables are also connected to urban economic growth. In 
particular, the overall index of government efficiency and the fight against corruption at city 
level are all positively associated with economic growth and, with the only exception of 
government efficiency in Regression 1 (Table 2), significant at the one percent level. Cities 
with more efficient, transparent, capable, and accountable governments perform better. 
Similarly, the deeper the fight against corruption at the local level, the greater the benefits in 
terms of economic growth. The only government institution variable that is not connected 
with growth in any way is the fight against corruption at provincial level. The coefficient is 
insignificant in both the random effects and the Hausman-Taylor estimations (Table 2, 
Regressions 3 and 6). This may be the consequence that, in a country like China with 
provinces that are far larger than most European states, the efforts by provincial governments 
to curb corruption may be ineffectual at the local level. There may therefore be a greater need 
– as indicated by the positive and significant corruption coefficient at the city level – to fight 
corruption locally. However, the introduction of the fight against corruption at provincial 
level in Table 2, Regression 6 makes the connection between the social filter variable and 
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city-level economic growth insignificant. It may thus just be the case that, while government 
efficiency and the fight against corruption at the local level are directly connected to 
economic growth, measures aimed at confronting corruption at the provincial level have a 
more subtle, indirect association. A reduction of corruption at the provincial level may well 
affect the relationship between other factors and urban growth in China. 
In order to check whether this is the case, we conduct the same regression introducing 
interaction terms between the fight against corruption at the provincial level and four key 
factors – innovation, human capital, density, and the social filter – that were identified in 
Table 2 as shapers of urban growth in China.
4
 As can be seen from the results of the analysis 
(Table 3), the introduction of the interaction terms in the Hausman-Taylor estimations does 
not generally affect the coefficients of the principal variables. The fight against corruption at 
the province level remains mostly insignificant, while the coefficients for patenting, human 
capital and density, with only a few exceptions, remain positive and significant. The only 
exception is the social filter. The association between the two other institutional variables and 
economic growth is also positive and significant throughout. 
Insert Table 3 around here 
All coefficients for the interaction terms between the fight against corruption at provincial 
level and the four elements considered are positive and significant at the 1 percent level. How 
can this be interpreted? The positive coefficients for the interaction terms signal that 
improvements in the social filter, innovation, human capital, and  density at city level in 
China yield significantly larger returns in those provinces where the fight against corruption 
has been pursued in a more earnest way. This is particularly the case for the social filter 
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 The same exercise was conducted for the government efficiency and the fight against corruption at city 
level variables yielding non-significant results. This implies that these two city-level institutional 
indicators mainly exercise a direct influence on urban growth. 
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index, where a one standard deviation increase in the social filter in cities located in 
provinces with a low tolerance of corruption is connected to much higher urban economic 
growth, relative to provinces that have not engaged in tackling corruption to the same extent. 
In fact, for cities in the latter provinces, any improvement in the local social filter is not 
associated at all to improvements in growth performance (see Figure A-1 in the appendix). 
The same, albeit to a lesser extent, applies for density and patenting, while the lowest effects 
of corruption fighting measures at provincial level are felt in the case of improvements in 
human capital (Figure A-1 in the appendix). 
Another important question is the extent to which the benefits of government efficiency 
concern all Chinese cities in the same way or just those cities that have achieved the best 
government efficiency conditions. To answer this question we decompose the government 
efficiency indicator at city level into quintiles. We use those cities with the lowest 
government quality (those in the bottom quintile) as the base category. The results of the 
regressions are reported in Table 4.
5
 
Insert Table 4 around here 
The results of the analysis point to the fact that the growth benefits of having a higher quality 
of government accrue fundamentally to those cities with the best government quality (Table 
4). The coefficients for quality of government are only positive and significant for those cities 
in the top 20 percent of government quality, while those cities below this threshold display a 
pattern that is not dissimilar than those found at the bottom of the government efficiency pile. 
One caveat about these results is related to potential endogeneity. Better government 
institutions can generate urban growth, but urban growth can also lead to the improvement of 
government institutions. The same applies for skills, innovation, density, and local 
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 The regressions are reported, to save space, without the control variables. The coefficients for the 
controls reproduce those of Tables 2 and 3. These can be made available upon request.  
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conditions. Whereas, for example, skills are regarded as a driver of economic growth, richer 
societies produce better trained individuals. Dealing with this type of multiple and 
simultaneous endogeneities is not simple and renders instrumental variable (IV) analysis 
almost impractical. There are no simple solutions to this problem. The use of dynamic panel 
analysis, through a system general methods of moments (GMM) estimation, provides, 
however, a common alternative to address the endogeneity caused by missing errors.
6
 Table 5 
reports the results of conducting the analysis of Model (1) using the system GMM 
estimations.  
The main results reported in Table 5 are generally robust to this different estimation method 
aiming to address potential endogeneity problems. There are, however, a number of changes, 
which mainly concern patenting. This proxy for innovation, which displayed positive and 
significant coefficients throughout in Table 2, is now negatively associated to urban growth 
(and with significant coefficients in Regressions1, 2 and 3). The introduction of the fight 
against corruption variable at the provincial level renders the coefficients for human capital, 
density and FDI insignificant. By contrast, the coefficients for our variables of interest – the 
institutional variables – remain virtually unchanged relative to those reported in Tables 2 and 
3. 
Insert Table 5 around here 
One final check concerns the robustness of these results to the introduction of spatial 
spillovers. The economic performance of cities anywhere in the world depends on how 
dynamic and/or well-off the cities surrounding it are. Any city surrounded by more dynamic 
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 Endogeneity can be associated with a number of factors, including missing variables, reverse causality, 
and measurement errors. The use of system GMM is unlikely to fully address all these biases. In particular, 
the main source of endogeneity – reverse causality – cannot be really treated empirically without rigorous 




cities – and, consequently, by cities that have a better endowment of skills and FDI, a higher 
capacity to innovate, better local conditions, and, in all likelihood, a denser economy – will 
have, according to most spatial econometrics analysis, a higher opportunity to grow. By 
contrast, cities surrounded by relatively less dynamic cities, will not benefit from the positive 
agglomeration externalities that proximity to more dynamic cities affords. In order to test 
whether this is the case and whether the introduction of spatial dependency affects the 
reported coefficients (and, in particular, those for government institutions variables), we 
modify Model (1) in the following manner: 
 !"#$%&'(,) = * + -.!"#$%&'(,)/. + 0.1 !"#$%&' + *.!"2""3(,)/. + *45'(,)/. +
*678"92:;(,)/. + *<!"&3&>(,)/. + *?93'2@!A2!:8B(,)/. + *CD$E(/. + *F2"9:2:>:23"9( +
νt+GHI                                    (2) 
where all the variables are as in Model (1), with the exception of the addition of: 
1 !"#$%&', which represents the spatial lag of economic growth rate. W is the 
spatial weight matrix, 
Three different spatial weight matrices have been considered (W1, W2, W3): 
a) A spatial neighbouring matrix, W1, where: 
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 The distance is the Euclidean distance between city i and city j. 
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The results of the analysis are presented in Table 6. They reveal the presence of strong 
growth spillovers related to being located in proximity to fast-growing cities. The coefficients 
for the spatial dependency variables are always positive and significant at the 1 percent level, 
regardless of whether just neighbouring cities are considered or whether the analysis is 
conducted a spatial weights matrix, or a quadratic inverse distance spatial weight matrix 
(Table 6). Chinese cities seem to benefit considerably from spillovers from neighbouring 
cities. 
The introduction of the spatial weights, however, does not affect the direction and 
significance of the coefficients of the other variables. The government institutional variables 
of interest – government efficiency and the fight against corruption at city level – remain 
positive and highly significant throughout. The same applies for patenting, human capital, 
density, the social filter, and FDI. They all retain their positive and highly significant 
connection to urban growth in China. The variable proxying for the fight against corruption at 
the provincial level is still insignificant and tends to lower the coefficient for the social filter. 
Insert Table 6 around here 
6. Conclusions and policy implications 
Rapid economic growth in China in recent decades has been to a large extent fuelled by the 
dynamism of its cities. Urban China is not only richer, but has also tended to be more 
economically dynamic than rural and small-town China. Cities have provided the 
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opportunities and jobs that have attracted millions of Chinese in what is an unprecedented 
urban transformation process (Wong, 2013: 273). Cities have also spawned a rapid 
development of firms and become a magnet for inward investment. 
The swift development of cities has coincided with a rising interest in the role of government 
institutions. Measures to improve the efficiency of local governments have been adopted 
throughout China (Tang et al., 2014) and the Chinese government has embarked in an ever 
more ambitious policy to curb corruption (Dong and Torgler, 2013; Gong, 2015). Yet, the 
link between government efficiency and urban growth in China remains poorly understood. 
Most work on city-level economic growth in China has been confined to issues of 
agglomeration, infrastructure and accessibility, industry structure, or skills and innovation. 
The analyses on how government institutions shape economic activity in China have been 
few and far between and, to the extent of our knowledge, there is no research that has linked 
government institutions to urban growth at city level. This is the gap that this paper has aimed 
to fill. 
The results of the analysis, covering 283 Chinese cities for the period between 2003 and 
2014, highlight how urban growth in China is not connected to just a single factor. Individual 
factors – from human capital and innovation to density, agglomeration, the social filter, and 
FDI, as well as government efficiency and the fight against corruption – can, on their own, 
not explain Chinese urban economic growth. The growth in the most dynamic Chinese cities 
is the result of a combination of favourable human capital, FDI, innovation endowments, 
density, and socio-economic conditions that blend in some urban areas in order to generate 
economic dynamism. Chinese cities also benefit from positive spillover effects linked to 
economic growth in neighbouring urban areas. 
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The analysis has also brought to the fore the role of government institutions in urban growth. 
In a period when considerable attention has been paid to the efficiency of local governments 
and were there has been a serious push to curb corruption throughout the country, cities with 
more efficient governments and those that have pursued local corruption with greater zeal 
have also grown faster. However, the benefits of more efficient governments seem to be 
concentrated only in those cities with the best overall government quality.  
The impact of government institutions on urban economic growth is not only direct. The fight 
against corruption at provincial level has contributed to enhance the returns of other factors 
behind economic growth, such as human capital, innovation, density, or the local social 
environment. By contrast, in provinces where a more lax approach towards corruption has 
been adopted, the returns of other factors behind urban growth have suffered. 
Consequently, the results of the analysis point towards the need to reflect about what type of 
urban interventions and policies are likely to yield greater economic returns across cities in 
China. Simple policies based on just one dimension are unlikely to do the trick. Urban growth 
policies can become more successful if they take into account the complexity and variety of 
local conditions across China and bring institutions to the fore. Disregarding government 
institutions will not only limit overall growth, but also undermine the effects of alternative 
policies. 
Finally, the analysis presented in the paper represents, however, only a start. It signals that 
government institutions matter for urban growth and that they matter in more than one way. 
Due to data limitations, at this stage we cannot dig deeper into the exact mechanisms through 
which government efficiency and the fight against corruption impinge on Chinese urban 
growth. Better institutional data covering longer periods of time, together with more in-depth 
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case study analyses will be necessary to extract the full set of connections and complex 
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Figure 1. Cities in China by GDP per capita (2003 – 2014). 
 




Figure 2. Urban economic growth rate (2003 – 2014). 
 




Figure 3. Government efficiency. 
Source: Own elaboration using data from the Research Report of Local Governments’ Efficiency in China 2016. 




Figure 4. Fight against corruption. 
 






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1. Definition and source of variables 
Variables Name   Measurements Data 
availability 
Data Source 
Dependent variable  
economic growth 
rate 




China City Statistical 
Yearbook 
Explanatory variables  
Economic and socioeconomic variables 
innovation patents Natural logarithm of share of patent 
applications per 10,000 inhabitants 
prefectural 
level 
SIPO (State Intellectual 
Property Office of the 
P.R.C) 











China City Statistical 
Yearbook 
agglomeration population Natural logarithm of the population at 
year-end (10,000 inhabitants) 
prefectural 
level 
China City Statistical 
Yearbook 
social filter index social filter Socio-economic structure of the region, 
including demographic structure, sectoral 






(2000/2010); China City 
Statistical Yearbook; 
Own elaboration  
FDI FDI Realized value of FDI as a share of GDP, 
US dollars are converted to RMB yuan 
based on annual average exchange rate 
prefectural 
level 





gov efficiency  Inverse of government efficiency rank 
2016(100/rank number)  
prefectural 
level 
 Research Report of 
Local Governments’ 
Efficiency in China 
2016. 2016. Science 





Number of corruption cases prosecuted 








number of criminal cases involving civil 




of China;  
http://china.caixin.com; 






Table 2. Factors behind economic growth in China, 2003-2014 






















































 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 





















 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) 



















 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 





 (0.000)   (0.003)  (0.002) 
fcorruption(city)  0.001
***





  (0.000)   (0.002) (0.003) 
fcorruption(province)   -0.024   0.003 














 (0.083) (0.083) (0.082) (0.228) (0.232) (0.230) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2888 2932 2845 2888 2932 2802 
Cities 283 283 283 283 283 283 
F    133.922 133.386 113.490 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.1, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***








Table 3. Factors behind economic growth, add interaction terms 


































































 (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.028) (0.029) 
social filter 0.006 -0.027
**
 0.006 0.005 0.007
*
 
 (0.004) (0.011) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
FDI 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
gov efficiency 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
fcorruption(city) 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 





 (0.056) (0.057) (0.056) (0.454) (0.082) 
sf*fc(province)  0.119
***
    
  (0.036)    
patents*fc(province)   0.145
***
   
   (0.026)   
hc*fc(province)    0.313
***
  
    (0.052)  
density*fc(province)     0.085
***
 












 (0.230) (0.230) (0.230) (0.243) (0.229) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2802 2802 2802 2802 2802 
Cities 283 283 283 283 283 
F 113.490 108.803 110.951 110.929 109.443 
Standard errors in parentheses.  
*
 p < 0.1, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***




Table 4. Decomposing government efficiency by quintiles. 
 (1) (2) 
 Hausman Taylor  Hausman Taylor 





 (0.053) (0.050) 
Gov efficiency 20-40% 0.042 0.067 
 (0.052) (0.049) 
Gov efficiency 40-60% 0.012 0.035 
 (0.052) (0.049) 
Gov efficiency 60-80% -0.013 0.009 




  (0.001) 
fcorruption(province)  0.015 
  (0.055) 
Controls Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes 
Observations 2932 2845 
Cities  283 283 
F 114.417 97.871 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
*
 p < 0.1, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01. Base category: cities in the bottom quintile in 








Table 5. Factors behind economic growth, system GMM estimations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
GDP per capita -1.072*** -1.066*** -1.067*** -1.017*** -0.980*** 
 (-24.786) (-25.462) (-25.561) (-24.232) (-21.673) 
patents -0.311** -0.340*** -0.311** 0.011 -0.040 
 (-2.309) (-2.617) (-2.471) (0.145) (-0.532) 
human capital 0.689*** 0.625*** 0.631*** 0.267 0.184 
 (3.602) (3.205) (3.314) (1.169) (1.016) 
density 0.142** 0.162*** 0.145** -0.008 0.015 
 (2.374) (2.637) (2.535) (-0.183) (0.335) 
population -0.565* -0.656** -0.552** 0.004 -0.124 
 (-1.906) (-2.149) (-2.084) (0.013) (-0.505) 
social filter 0.083 0.060 0.070 0.140** 0.107 
 (1.407) (0.995) (1.276) (2.135) (1.618) 
FDI 0.036 0.033 0.027 -0.093 -0.085 
 (0.382) (0.346) (0.304) (-1.467) (-1.333) 
gov efficiency  0.021***   0.024*** 
  (2.632)   (3.031) 
fcorruption(city)   0.016**  0.021** 
   (2.268)  (2.206) 
fcorruption(province)    0.090 0.228 
    (0.248) (0.647) 
constant 6.730*** 7.562*** 6.923*** 7.558*** 8.153*** 
 (2.595) (2.805) (2.834) (4.592) (5.449) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2932 2888 2932 2845 2802 
Cities 283 283 283 283 283 
P value of Hansen test 0.031 0.039 0.025 0.065 0.088 
AR(1) [0.106] [0.118] [0.092] [0.121] [0.181] 
AR(2) [0.349] [0.492] [0.487] [0.701] [0.883] 
z statistics in parentheses. * p<.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The second lags of natural logarithm of 
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Table A-1. Test results for the principle component analysis 
Principal component analysis: eigenanalysis of the correlation matrix 
Component Eigenvalue Difference(%) Cumulative(%) 
Comp1 1.511 37.780 37.780 
Comp2 0.935 23.378 65.158 
Comp3 0.864 21.593 82.751 
Comp4 0.690 17.249 100 
 
Principal component analysis : principal components’ coefficients 













Table A-2. Government efficiency indices 







and public health 
services(weight=0.4
) 
per capita patent applications (items/10,000 persons) 
per capita primary and middle schools (units/10,000 
persons) 
per capita  enrolments in primary and middle schools 
(person/10,000 persons) 
government budgetary expenditures appropriation in 
education (%) 
radio coverage rate of the population (%) 
ratio of health care institutions and total population 
(unit/10,000 persons) (%) 
 per capita beds in health care institutions (unit/ 1,000 
persons)(%) 
per capita employed medical technicians in healthcare 
institutions (person/1000 persons) 
Public security  
services 
(weight=0.15) 
ratio of deaths in production safety accidents and total 
population (%) 
ration of deaths in production safety accidents and general 
domestic production(GDP) (cases/1,000 million Yuan) 




public budgetary expenditures appropriation in social 
security net and employment effort (%) 
government budgetary expenditures appropriation in affairs 





ratio of total investment in fixed assets and GDP (%) 
per-capita business volume of postal services (yuan) 
popularization rate of fixed line telephone (sets/100 
persons) 
popularization rate of mobile telephone (sets/100 persons) 
popularization rate of internet (%) 





 public expenditures appropriation in covering the expenses 
of public officials, including the expenses on the affairs of 
overseas visits, transportation,  and dining  (yuan/ (persons. 
kilometre square)) 
per capita government budgetary expenditures 
(yuan/(persons. kilometre square)) 
ratio of non-taxed revenue and general public budget 
revenue (%)  





 per capita disposable income of rural households (yuan) 
per-capita disposable income of urban households (yuan) 
consumer price index (preceding year=100) 
per-capita GDP (yuan) 






disclosure of information about government leaders 







disclosure of report on the work of the government  
disclosure of report on government budget  
disclosure of plan on government affairs  
disclosure of statistical bulletin  




efficiency in response to personal consultation affairs 
 efficiency in executing public affairs 
Note: The four municipalities, including Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Chongqing, do not 





Table A-3. Government efficiency ranks by city, 2016 
City Rank City Rank City Rank 
Shenzhen 1 Anyang 101 Xinzhou 201 
Fushun 2 Jinchang 102 Dezhou 202 
Shannan 3 Mudanjiang 103 Kaifeng 203 
Guangzhou 4 Xuzhou 104 Qiqihar 204 
Suzhou 5 Huangshi 105 Yichang 205 
Zhuhai 6 Datong 106 Taizhou 206 
Wuxi 7 Xinxiang 107 Nanchong 207 
Quanzhou 8 Guigang 108 Jiamusi 208 
Nanjing 9 Puyang 109 Bazhong 209 
Xiamen 10 Changde 110 Zhoukou 210 
Changzhou 11 Yueyang 111 Zunyi 211 
Shaoxing 12 Xining 112 Heyuan 212 
Wenzhou 13 Harbin 113 Dingxi 213 
Kunming 14 Yulin 114 Hulunbuir 214 
Xi'an 15 Xinyang 115 Liaocheng 215 
Dongguan 16 Panjin 116 Yangjiang 216 
Hangzhou 17 Baise 117 Zhaotong 217 
Ningbo 18 Lianyungang 118 Bijie 218 
Putian 19 Yingkou 119 Fangchenggang 219 
Nantong 20 Anqing 120 Chaozhou 220 
Danzhou 21 Baoshan 121 Yulin 221 
Dalian 22 Yancheng 122 Lu'an 222 
Zhenjiang 23 Baicheng 123 Pingliang 223 
Jinan 24 Bozhou 124 Huaihua 224 
Zhangye 25 Jixi 125 Shangluo 225 
Karamay 26 Changchun 126 Shaoyang 226 
Fuzhou 27 Lhasa 127 Meishan  227 
Foshan 28 Qujing 128 Guyuan 228 
Weihai 29 Yan'an 129 Shantou 229 
Changsha 30 Wuhu 130 Changzhi 230 
Tongchuan 31 Jincheng 131 Hengyang 231 
Chenzhou 32 Shiyan 132 Xiaogan 232 
Shenyang 33 Xuchang 133 Mianyang 233 
Taizhou 34 Fuxin 134 Yiyang 234 
Dongying 35 Hezhou 135 Linfen 235 
Yinchuan 36 Pingdingshan 136 Zhongwei 236 
Qingdao 37 Liaoyang 137 Tai'an 237 
Jinhua 38 Yuncheng 138 Yibin 238 
Haikou 39 Yongzhou 139 Beihai 239 
Yangzhou 40 Jieyang 140 Tongling 240 
Zhongshan 41 Baishan 141 Zigong 241 
Taiyuan 42 Loudi 142 Anshun 242 
Maanshan 43 Zhoushan 143 Weinan 243 
Linzhi 44 Suining 144 Jingzhou 244 
56 
 
Sanming 45 Hefei 145 Xingtai 245 
Baotou 46 Heze 146 Guilin 246 
Ganzhou 47 Luoyang 147 Haidong 247 
Yantai 48 Suzhou 148 Chengde 248 
Huzhou 49 Guangyuan 149 Turpan 249 
Weifang 50 Dandong 150 Cangzhou 250 
Chengdu 51 Meizhou 151 Yichun 251 
Jiuquan 52 Qingyang 152 Zaozhuang 252 
Panzhihila 53 Ulanqab 153 Huangshan 253 
Longyan 54 Luzhou 154 Lijiang 254 
Zhengzhou 55 Qinzhou 155 Yuxi 255 
Wuwei 56 Xiangyang 156 Hami 256 
Jiaxing 57 Linyi 157 Ya'an 257 
Jiujiang 58 Zhanjiang 158 Nanyang 258 
Tonghua 59 Sanya 159 Laiwu 259 
Yingtan 60 Tongren 160 Pu'er 260 
Wuhan 61 Chongziio 161 Wuzhou 261 
Zhangzhou 62 Huanggang 162 Tianshui 262 
Suqian 63 Zibo 163 Jiaozuo 263 
Shangrao 64 Shaoguan 164 Shuangyashan 264 
Sanmenxia 65 Nanchang 165 Shizuishan 265 
Zhumadian 66 Jinzhong 166 Langfang 266 
Anshan 67 Zhangjiakou 167 Tangshan 267 
Jiangmen 68 Xuancheng 168 Heihe 268 
Xianning 69 Shuozhou 169 Qingyuan 269 
Xinyu 70 Liuzhou 170 Deyang 270 
Guiyang 71 Benxi 171 Handan 271 
Fuyang 72 Qinhuangdao 172 Wuhai 272 
Lishui 73 Leshan 173 Hengshui 273 
Ningde 74 Chuzhou 174 Huainan 274 
Ji’an 75 Guang'an 175 Suizhou 275 
Nanning 76 Maoming 176 Wuzhong 276 
Chaoyang 77 Shijiazhuang 177 Shanwei 277 
Bengbu 78 Daqing 178 Dazhou 278 
Longnan 79 Ankang 179 Changdu 279 
Xianyang 80 Neijiang 180 Luohe 280 
Shangqiu 81 Jingmen 181 Baoding 281 
Yichun 82 Chifeng 182 Hechi 282 
Nanping 83 Jingdezhen 183 Qitaihe 283 
Huizhou 84 Xiangtan 184 Suihua 284 
Zhuzhou 85 Huaibei 185 Hegang 285 
Hanzhong 86 Bayannur 186 Binzhou 286 
Pingxiang 87 Jining 187 Tiding 287 
Liupanshui 88 Songyuan 188 Ezhou 288 
Baoji 89 Lanzhou 189 Lvliang 289 
Laibiri 90 Yunfu 190 Shigatse 290 
Baiyin 91 Siping 191 Zhangjiajie 291 
57 
 
Jinzhou 92 Erdos 192 Hebi 292 
Liaoyuan 93 Huludao 193   
Hohhot 94 Tongliao 194   
Urumchi 95 Yangquan 195   
Jilin 96 Chizhou 196   
Huai'an 97 Ziyang 197   
Zhaoqing 98 Fuzhou 198   
Quzhou 99 Jiayuguan 199   





Table A-4. Descriptive statistics for the main variables 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
economic growth rate 3095 0.143 0.167 -4.459 4.776 
GDP per capita 3387 9.966 0.812 4.595 13.056 
patents 3393 0.144 1.716 -5.857 5.367 
human capital 3396 8.778 0.932 2.763 12.894 
density 3396 4.229 3.226 0.047 26.615 
population 3396 5.851 0.690 2.795 8.124 
social filter 3342 0.000 1.000 -7.427 4.004 
FDI 3272 2.217  2.433  0.000  37.579  
gov_efficiency 3348 2.078 7.102 0.342 100.000 
fcorruption(city) 3396 10.502 11.561 0.000 130.000 























Table A-5. Factors behind economic growth, decomposing social filter  













GDP per capita -0.565*** -0.562*** -0.563*** -0.560*** -0.564*** -0.549*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
patents 0.022*** 0.021*** 0.023*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.017*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
human capital 0.060*** 0.058*** 0.070*** 0.058*** 0.067*** 0.049*** 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.010) 
density 0.014*** 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.014*** 0.011*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
population -0.164*** -0.159*** -0.155*** -0.158*** -0.167*** -0.156*** 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
FDI 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
gov efficiency 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
fcorruption(city) 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
sharepri 0.001***    0.001**  
 (0.000)    (0.000)  
shareagri  -0.003***   -0.002***  
  (0.001)   (0.001)  
share1524   -0.005  -0.004  
   (0.002)  (0.002)  
unemp    -0.000** -0.000**  
    (0.000) (0.000)  
social filter      0.013*** 
      (0.004) 
constant 5.577*** 5.601*** 5.551*** 5.565*** 6.231*** 5.516*** 
 (0.209) (0.208) (0.208) (0.208) (0.227) (0.208) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2913 2902 2927 2927 2888 2875 
Cities 283 283 283 283 283 283 
F 126.459 126.350 125.682 125.446 110.025 124.014 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
